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LAND AND WATER
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NUMBER I

1970

VOLUME V1

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
HaroldS. Bloomenthal*
INTRODUCTION

T

HE Public Land Law Review Commission's substantive
recommendations generally are bold and far reaching
placing emphasis on modern planning techniques and environmental controls, but unfortunately the administrative procedures recommendations represent little more than the pouring of old wine into new bottles. The recommendations are
based in part on an underlying study' which reflects a prodigious effort of scholarship and the sagacious comments of
one who has devoted a lifetime to the study of administrative
law, but which fails to inquire into how the administrative
process really works. This is not to suggest that none of the
recommendations have merit, but rather that they fail to explore, as is characteristic of much of current administrative
law scholarship, alternative procedures for resolving conflicts,
exercising discretion, evolving and implementing policy so
desperately needed if the modern land policies otherwise recommended are to be effectuated. The advanced land planning
and use recommendations of the Report, if implemented, inevitably will place a tremendous strain on administrative procedures and, in the author's judgment, if accompanied by
some of the recommendations for antiquated administrative
procedures will overwhelm the administrative process.
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A good deal of the administrative procedure recommendations reflect a longing for a simpler society and a less complex set of problems.2 The ideal posed is a system under which
Congress establishes guidelines and the details are filled in by
the public land agencies through rule-making3 resulting in a
high degree of probability in terms of predicting decisions
and permitting all concerned without too much legal advice to
determine where they stand with respect to public land matters. Under such a system, it is blithely assumed, most of the
appeal process will be greatly simplified (and criticism eliminated) as it will be a relatively easy matter for reviewers to
reach a correct decision.' The Report categorically rejects the
use of administrative adjudication to develop and evolve policy
and law, thus placing the Commission squarely on the side of
the late Justice Jackson who in dissent characterized such
ad hoc "rule-making" as administrative authoritarianism.'
RULE-MAKING

The Commission's Report declares: "The lack of specific
and meaningful guidelines in most of the public land laws is
a significant contributing factor underlying many procedural
complaints. I" This may or may not be; presumably, it is based
on the contract Study which takes the public land agencies
to task for not utilizing their rule-making powers so as to implement substantive provisions to a greater extent.' Insofar
2. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM., ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS

3.
4.

5.
6.

7.

251 (1970).

[Hereinafter

cited as REPORT].
REPORT, 251.
Thus the Commission in rejecting an independent review board concluded
that by providing more specific guidelines in "statutes or regulations, which
spell out the nature of rights or privileges at issue and the standards under
which they can be acquired, terminated or otherwise affected . . . would
largely eliminate the need for any independent administrative review board."
Id., 254.
Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 216 (1946).
REPORT, 251.
"[It] is quite apparent that the public land agencies now do not attempt to
utilize the rule-making process for the development of policy but only for
routine administrative purposes." ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES STUDY 308.
The Study is also critical of the failure to utilize "interpretative regulations" of the type routinely employed by Internal Revenue Service. See id.
at 308-399. The Study in this respect ignores the available (albeit inadequate) procedures within the Department of the Interior for interpretative
memoranda; perhaps, because not set forth in the regulations or as an established procedure. In fact, however, the Associate Solicitor for Public Lands
renders interpretative opinions (or memoranda) largely in his capacity as
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as the Study itself is concerned, one can only say that the assertion is not proven. In fact, the Study contains much evidence of substantive implementation through statutory standards ;' points out that in many other instances that rulemaking largely tracks the statute because the statute is so
specific and detailed, and observes that the agency cannot be
expected to resolve policy issues through rule-making where
the issue is a politically sensitive one and Congress itself vacillates as to what should be an appropriate policy. 0 Further,
the study contains no real analysis of the flow of adjudicatory
decisions in terms of the extent to which regulations and/or
precedent are relied upon as a basis for decision." The Coinlegal advisor to the Director of the Bureau of Land Management. If the
matter is of sufficient importance it is asigned an M number and is published. A large number of such opinions, however, are given without being
assigned an M number and these are not generally published, although they
are systematically filed by the docket section of the Department. Interview
with Thomas Cavanaugh, Associate Solicitor, on August 27, 1965.
8. Regarding oil and gas leasing the Study states: "The regulations substantively implement the statute in important respects" and then lists a number
of such regulations. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES STUDY 59. Further, "the
separate regulations respecting other Mineral Leasing Act minerals also
substantively implement or interpret the statutes as well as add to the statutory procedures." Id. at 59-60. The operating regulations of the U.S.G.S.
contain "some of the most significant substantive implementations of the
statutes. . . ." Id. at 61.

9. Regarding patent application procedures for mining claims: "In the face of
statutes thus specific, substantive implementation by regulation is minor in
character....

."

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES STUDY 54.

10. "[The] agencies should not be criticized for failure to venture the explications of policy on subjects upon which Congress itself is sharply divided .... ." Id, 307.
11. The author selected at random the first twenty-one matters reported in
Gower's Federal Service for Oil and Gas in 1969. Three involved memoranda
rather than decisions and were eliminated leaving a total of 18 cases. Three
of the cases involved Duncan Miller and the same contention pertaining to
bitumen tars that had been rejected in 1966 and on the basis of its prior
decision appellant's contentions were denied. See note 26, infra, and related
discussion. Four cases involved accreted lands which are under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Army title of which was being disputed by
the State of Louisiana. The Department initially sustained rejection of the
offers based upon a 1962 decision; however, upon reconsideration, consideration of the offers based upon a current record was authorized as it appeared that the Department of the Army was now amenable to leasing and
it might be in the interest of the United States to raise the title issue through
the issuance of oil and gas leases. Three of the cases involved late rental
payments and were resolved on the basis of prior decisions and a reasonably
clear interpretation of the statute. Two involved party in interest statements and are based on prior decisions. One involved an offer to lease an
alleged hiatus and was resolved by applying the well-established principle
that monuments on the ground control descriptions. One case involving
utilization of the multiple-mineral development statute procedures for
clearing title clouds raised by old unpatented mining claims, was suspended
pending determination of issues presently being litigated in the courts (see
note 36, infra). In the remaining four cases the BLM was reversed and the
Solicitor found for the applicant based upon the Solicitor's interpretation
of the relevant regulations.
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mission's insistence on rule-making as a preferable, if not exclusive means of developing the law is supported only by a
priori reasoning and a lay concept of the "rule of law."
The Study's case for the failure of the Department of
Interior to utilize its rule-making power is based largely on
the failure of the Department to define the "valuable mineral" or "discovery" concept through rule-making.12 One may
question whether the Department has authority in this area
beyond the adoption of a so-called interpretive rule rather than
legislative rule, 3 but this aside it is clear that the development
of this concept through "adjudication" has been an uneven
one. However, the failure in this regard (if it may be regarded as such) is not a result of the wrong choice between
rule-making and adjudication, but the lack of a national policy with respect to mineral development (of the hard rock
type) in the context of public land law and the archaic nature
12. "Specially noticeable is the failure to implement, even despite aid from the
courts .. .the statutory term 'valuable' mineral for purposes of valid discovery." ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES STUDY 54. "On the procedural side,
again there is notable failure to emphasize the place in the procedures of the
requisite discovery of 'valuable' mineral-which would be helpful in warning
against making locations in advance of due discovery." Id. 308. "In this field
[interpretative regulations] an example would be a possible regulation explicating the administrative understanding, requirements, and application
of the phrase 'valuable mineral' as used in the Mining Location Law-which
would bring the matter out into the open, so to speak, rather than leaving
it to be gleaned from departmental decisions." Id. at CJR. These comments
in terms of the concrete substantive issue involved divorce the text of the
mining law from its historical origins and development and from how the
law operates in practice. The Courts have developed the valuable mineral
concept primarily in a different context-conflicts between two conflicting
unpatented claims. The role of the Courts has not been a particularly constructive one. Someone better talk to the mining claimants who are to-day
every day of the year locating claims without having made a discoverythe problem in this area is not the need for a "warning" about the discovery
requirements. Reliance is being placed upon pedis possessio (which is not
as the Study states a "non exclusive right" id.at 55) and the unwritten
law which to a degree functions because all locators are in the same position
and, hence, must fear retaliation if they jump someone else's claims. On
pedis possessio see note 17, infra.
13. The Mineral Location Act (17 Stat. 91) contains no delegation of rulemaking authority to the Secretary of Interior. According to the Study
there are 400 separate statutory sections conferring rule-making powers on
public land agencies. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES STUDY 234. The general
rule-making authority, however, referred to by the Study (id. fn 17 at 249)
refer to mineral leasing and lignites only.
14. The development of the valuable mineral concept has involved an inter-play
between judicial decisions and Department of Interior decisions. Judicial
decisions have grown out of adverse proceedings ancillary to a patent application, conflicts between rival mining claimants and judicial review of
administrative decisions. Administrative decisions have involved contest
cases both in connection with applications for mineral patents and unpatented
mining claims. An early statement of the prudent man test from Castle v.
Womble, 19 L.D. 455 (1894) is "where mineral is found and the evidence
shows that a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further
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of the location system.1 5 The Administrative Procedures
Study has an Alice in Wonderland air about it in this context
in that it assumes that only patented mining claims and the
patent procedures for mining claims are relevant; in divorcnig

substance from procedure it fails to take into account the
havoc unpatented mining claims raise in public land administration and the role the contest procedure plays in this context.'6 One can make a rather good case that the development
of the valuable mineral concept through adjudication over a
period of years has evolved the best possible policy in the light
of the context within which it operates. 7 In a situation in
expenditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of success
in developing a valuable mine." A comparable judicial statement of the
rule can be found in Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313, 322 (1905). An important modern qualification (but in the context of a patent application)
is the holding that it is not "enough that the showing might warrant further
exploration in hopes of finding a valuable deposit." United States v. Altman,
68 I.D. 235 (1961). An administrative decision also holds that "it is reasonable . . .to apply to a higher standard and more rigid compliance with the
requirements of the mining laws where the claim is located within a National
Forest." Eleanor A. Gray, GFS Mining S0-1964-25, A-28710 (May 7, 1964).
Finally, in Coleman, the Supreme Court sustained the denial of a mineral
patent because there was no market for the mineral stating, "profitability
is an important consideration in applying the prudent-man test, and the
marketability test which the Secretary has used here merely recognizes this
fact." United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 602 (1968). However, at
the same time in cases between conflicting unpatented mining claims extending back to Chrisman v. Miller, supra, the "decisions exhibit a marked
liberality in sustaining a finding of discovery." Western Standard Uranium
Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377, (Wyo. 1960).
15. Some of these deficiencies are recognized in those portions of the Report dealing with Mineral Resources. See REPORT 124-130. For an earlier recognition
of these problems see C. Martz, Pick and Shovel Mining Laws in an Atomic
Age: A Case for Reform, 27 ROCKY MTN. L. REv 37 5 (1955). See also The
Law of Uranium Development-A Symposium, 9 Wyo. L. J. 137 (1955).
16. The unpatented mining claim gave the locator the exclusive right to possession of the surface prior to patent. Prior to August 14, 1954, these rights
were such that they precluded the issuance of a subsequent federal oil and
gas lease. The Multiple Mineral Development Statute (30 U.S.C.A. § 521)
adopted in 1954 modified prospectively the rights of a mineral locator so as
to permit leasing for leasing act minerals on located lands and the Surface
Resources Act adopted in 1955 (30 U.S.C.A. § 601) restricts surface use
by the mining locator and permits to a degree the appropriate federal
agency to manage other surface resources. However, mining remains paramount so as to limit the extent to which environmental controls can be imposed and after patent the mining claimant is entitled not only to the minerals but also the surface. The administrative contest procedure in connection
with applications for patents has been the means by which the Forest Service and the Department of Interior have attempted to preclude surface resources from passing into private ownership where the mineral claim is based
on questionable mineral values and as used in connection with unpatented
claims is a device for clearing title to federal lands and preventing the use
of the claim for non-mineral purposes.
17. Since very few minerals are discovered on the surface, the mining operator
needs reasonably extensive acreage to justify incurring substantial exploration expenditures in the form of exploration drilling and the like. The practice, therefore, is to locate claims before discovery or on the basis of the
presence of some but not commercial mineralization. The presence of some
mineralization is sufficient to protect the claim against other locators (See
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which Congress has been unwilling to face up to the consequences for almost a 100 years, it is difficult to fault the Department for belatedly having done so. If it were not for concrete cases requiring specific adjudicative decisions by the Department of Interior the law would be an even greater morass
in this area."
This is not to say that Congress in certain areas shouldn't
lay down better guidelines or that the public land agencies
should not do a better job of implementing policy through
rule-making. In areas of broad policy, particularly politically
sensitive ones, Congress should make a deliberate choice and
spell it out. The general political choices between conservation
vs. development with the major subdivisions thereof should
be made by Congress. Substandards in an area in which expertise is significant and in areas in which Congress does not
have the time or predilection to make an informed choice
should be developed by the agency. Rule-making is often,
if not generally, the ideal method for developing such standards because it permits wider participation in the decision
and generally acts prospectively.1 9 However, it is not possible
to foresee every variation of a problem and there are some
problems that are better handled on the basis of accumulated
note 14, supra) and even in the absence of mineralization the locator will
be protected against other locators to the extent of his claim if in actual
possession and diligently seeking discovery. Adams v. Benedict, 327 P.2d
308 (N. M. 1958). The latter doctrine is generally referred to as pedis possessio. As against the federal government even the declaration of a claim as
null and void for lack of discovery does not preclude the mining claimant
from continuing to explore and rely on the pedis possessio doctrine. United
States v. Carlile, 67 I.D. 417 (1960). The mining claimant without protection
is one who has discovered a deposit which because of its grade and/or the
current market price for the mineral cannot operate the deposit at a profit.
In addition the mining claimant who cannot obtain a patent because of lack
of discovery will not be able to continue to explore if the lands are withdrawn.
The system is far from an ideal one, but in view of the competing interests
involved it might be difficult to devise a better one without amending the
statute which the mining industry has short-sightedly over the years regarded as sacrosanct.
18. In all probability an attempt to "legislate" through rule-making in this
context would have reflected the same type of stand-off that has resulted in
legislative inaction by Congress. Unlike some other problems (oil-shale
development, for example) the most pressing mining law problems could
not be deferred indefinitely.
19. "... The function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed,
as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to
be applied in the future. But any rigid requirement to that effect would
make the administrative process inflexible and incapable of dealing with
Securities and Exchange
many of the specialized problems which arise .
Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). See also Davis,
Discretionary Justice 55-65 (1969).
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case experience. This is, of course, the genius of the "common
law" in that it operates in the context of concrete facts based
on an actual record rather than hypothetical assumptions
concerning the nature of the problems and its perimeters. The
area of environmental control, one would think, may be a good
example; certainly, we will have better standards after 10
years of actual case experience than we can hope for now. The
Commission's Report reflects much useful thinking in this
area, 20 and undoubtedly somewhat general standards can be
adopted now through the rule-making process, but public
policy should not be denied the contribution that the flow of
decisions can make in refining and evolving those standards.
Nor can one argue with the recommendation with respect
to rule-making that "Deliberately instituted and specially
staffed organizations are essential. This should be an integral
part of policymaking and not be relegated to the clerical or
housekeeping level. "" This recommendation is appropriate
for most administrative agencies; the failure to implement it
may be the result of inertia and inattention or it may be the
failure to provide the staff and funds. Nor can one argue
against greater public participation in the rule-making process which as a very minimum should follow APA procedures
(which the BLM has been doing) and which should in some instances provide for public bearings.2 2 A citizen advisory board
to advise the heads of departments with respect to rule-making
as recommended " may also be appropriate, although one can
argue that it is not possible to consult such boards "on contemplated changes in any and all aspects of public land policy."
The Public Land Law Review Commission appears to be much
impressed with such Boards because of its apparent success
in utilizing one; however, one must take into account that the
Commission has had but one specific task to accomplish over a
four and one-half year period. The heads of agencies must
have some discretion as to the degree to which they consult with
such an advisory board.
20.

REPORT 77-80.

21. REPORT 252. In addition as recommended by the Study, selected portions of
the departmental manuals should be promulgated as rules. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES STUDY 269-270.

22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
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The really startling recommendation is "that agencies be
prohibited from adjudicating any case other than in accord
with standards and interpretations contained in published
regulations. Where Congress has provided statutory rights,
the agencies should be prohibited from denying the right on
any grounds not stated in the regulations .
,,."If this
means in accord with general standards, it will not change the
results of adjudication. In fact, it will encourage the use of
general standards in rule-making and make rules less useful
than heretofore. It will, in any event, cause decision makers
to be less articulate in rationalizing the basis for their decisions. If on the other hand, it means every decision must be
based on a specific regulation or interpretation without room
for further interpretation, it will result in poor quality decision making and delayed (if not indefinitely postponed) policy formulation. Which result will actually follow, the author
would hesitate to predict. But one consequence is quite predictable and that is there will be innumerable arguments between the parties as to whether there is a regulation or prior
interpretation covering the case being adjudicated. It is submitted that such arguments will do nothing but obscure the
real issues in the case.
Let us take a concrete example. One Duncan Miller25
applies for and receives an oil and gas lease. le contends that
it entitles him to all the "oil" underlying the tract including
those found in bitumen tars. In fact, at the time his lease was
issued there was no statute, regulation or interpretation that
specifically says that he was not so entitled. Based, however,
on legislative history, consistent administrative construction,
etc., the Department concludes (and probably all oil and gas
lawyers would agree) that the federal oil and gas lease does not
24. Ibid. It is difficult to understand how this recommendation would be implemented if, as is stated in the Report, adjudication involves "a multitude
of unrelated and usually factually distinguishable cases." Id. at 252. How
will the rule-makers ever catch up with the cases? One paragraph later the
Report contradicts itself by asserting (albeit after more prodigious rulemaking efforts), that it will only be "unique cases" in which there will not
-be applicable "published standards." Ibid.
25. According to a recent Solicitor's Opinion Duncan Miller has filed over 200
appeals to the Secretary over the past 14 years. The appeals are described
as being invariably "discursive, incoherent documents replete with irrelevances," requiring the Department to be "very patient in attempting to
extract meaningful arguments from the appeals." Duncan Miller, GFS
Oil and Gas SO-1969-6, A-31005, March 4, 1969.
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include bitumen tars.2 6 Consider the ramifications of the
Commission's recommendations when two applicants are competing for a lease to the same tract and one contends that the
other for one reason or another is not entitled to a lease advancing in support thereof a reasonable interpretation of the statute of the regulations. The first qualified applicant has a
statutory right to the lease, the Courts have said, even though
there has been a prior but deficient application. 7 Assuming
a deficiency in the first application based upon a reasonable
construction of the statute, if such construction is not expressed in the regulations or a prior interpretation, how does
the agency adjudicate so as to resolve the issue between the
competing applicants?
There is considerable danger in deluding ourselves into
thinking that better statutory guidelines and a more effective
use of the rule-making power minimizes the problem of discretion. The power of decision makers within the administrative
process to make a choice among competing alternatives is inherent and essential both in terms of formulation of evolving
standards and in terms of deciding particular cases. It is a
dangerous deception because to the extent the public land agencies are absolutely precluded from evolving policy incidental
to ad hoc adjudication public lands, or their use, will pass into
private hands under circumstances inconsistent with the general public interest. Even more important, to the extent we
delude ourselves into thinking that rule-making will always
effectively control discretion we fail to explore alternative
methods of controlling, limiting and structuring discretion.2 8
In view of the extended role envisioned by the Commission's Report for the public land agencies, much of which involves the breaking of new ground, the necessity of interpretation as part of the adjudicative process will increase rather
than lessen even if Congress were prepared and capable of
adopting guidelines as extensive as those envisioned by the
Commission and even though a deliberate effort is made to
26. Duncan Miller, 73 I.D. 211 (1966).
27. See Davis, Discretionary Justice-A Preliminary Inquiry, Chs. III through
V (1969).
28. McKay v. Wahlemaier, 226 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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formulate policy through rule-making. Hard-rock minerals
in the future would be subject to what is in large part a permit
and leasing system which inevitably will breed the type of litigation so prolifigate with respect to oil and gas leasing. 9
There will be dispositions of grazing lands 0 and lands for
intensive agriculture 1 in each instance requiring a determination of whether such lands are "known mineral lands" which
is to be the key to whether or not minerals are reserved to the
government.2 A glance at a chart of the type of environmental standards that might be established included, but not specifically endorsed at pp. 78-79 of the Commission's Report,
makes apparent the innumerable and difficult problems of interpretation that will arise in applying such standards.
29.

One need only examine random volumes of Gower's Federal Service for Oil
and Gas to realize what a litigation breeder the leasing system is. The description, filing, rental, royalty and work requirements envisioned for the
new mining location system (See REPORT 121-130) and the resolving
of conflicting applications for permits will undoubtedly generate similar
administrative litigation. While there is presently a substantial amount
of adjudication within the Department involving the mining laws, most of
the cases involve either the issue of "discovery" or "common variety" mineral.
30. Although the Report starts out with the declaration on p. 1 that "we urge
reversal of the policy that the United States should dispose of the so-called
unappropriated public domain lands," it is clear from what is said generally
and specific recommendations that fairly large-scale disposals are contemplated. One of the largest disposals would result from the recommendation
that out of the 273 million acres now being used for grazing a determination
of lands chiefly valuable for domestic livestock be made and (with some
qualification) disposed of at market value primarily to grazing permittees.
REPORT 115.
31. REPORT 179-180.
32. REPORT 136-137. On the appropriate standard for determining a mineral
reservation within three paragraphs three different general standards
are employed: (1) "All mineral interests known to be of value should
be reserved . . ." id. at 136. (2) "Reserving valuable mineral interests . . ." id.
at 137. (3) "Land is not valuable for minerals . . ." id. at 137. The latter
standard is used in the context of allowing surface owners to purchase previously deserved mineral interests and, perhaps, is intended to be a different
standard. Thus, the Commission fails to face up to the very crucial question
of what type of mineral value will determine whether minerals are to be reserved to the United States. If it is to serve its puropted purposes of "providing potential revenues," "permitting consolidation of mineral interests for potential development," and to forestall "possible windfallh to surface owners"
(id. at 137); presumably, the reservation should be based on prospective
rather than established mineral value. If it were otherwise, one could hardly
square the other recommendations of the Commission attaching a relatively
high priority to mineral development. Id. at 121-122. With lands programmed for withdrawal completely from mineral development (id. at 123)
and mineral development restricted in favor of environmental controls (id.
68-70), it would seem to be sheer folly to dispose of potential mineral lands
for grazing and agricultural purposes. Compare reservations under the
present homestead laws for certain leasing act minerals if the lands are
"withdrawn or classified or reported as valuable" for such minerals. 30
U.S.C.A. § 122. See Donald S. Tedford, GFS Oil and Gas SO-1964-36, A29963, March, 24, 1964 and Erma F. Anderson, GFS Oil and Gas SO-1963-64,
A-29513, July 5, 1963, holding that the appropriate standard in this context is prospective mineral value.
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The "rule of law" does not mean, and has never meant
except as an uninformed lay view, that the law must specifically and precisely cover each situation. The "rule of law"
means that a reasonable interpretation of the sources of law
(which includes statutes, regulations, legislative history, administrative constructions of long standing, the purpose of the
statute and all the other aids to statutory construction) has
been reached after a consideration of the competing interpretations advanced by adversary parties. We should get on
with the task of improving the administrative process rather
than imposing impossible, unrealistic and unique burdens on
public land administrative procedures.
ADJUDICATION-HEARINGS

The dissatisfaction with the hearing process reflected in
testimony given before the Commission is probably attributable in part to the substantive doctrines applied by the Department." It is probably a safe assumption that much of the
substantive criticism has been engendered by a few crucial
decisions (which have then become precedents) relating to
" discovery, ' ' 34 ''common variety minerals," ' "5 "oil shale
claims" '3 ' and a limited number of facets of oil and gas leasing. 7 The hearing and appeal procedures themselves probably
generate much of the dissatisfaction, and, indeed, the procedures are vulnerable to criticism and in some respects are
constitutionally questionable.
There is little published information other than the regulations available as to how the adjudicative process actually
33.

34.
35.

36.
47.

The author has not had an opportunity to read the transcript and hence
this paragraph is based on supposition. Both the Study and the Report make
incidental references to the testimony without specifically relying on same
as a basis for their recommendations. See, e.g., REPORT 253, 254, 255.
See note 14, supra.
See, for example, Kelly Shannon, 70 I.D. 136 (1963) involving building stone
as a common variety mineral and holding that any building stone used as
such is a common variety mineral. Compare United States v. Coleman, 399
U.S. 599, 604 (1968) resulting in an unacknowledged revision of the Department's position in United States Minerals Development Corp., 75 I.D. 129
(1968). See also McClarty v. Secretary of Interior, 408 F.2d 907 (1969).
See Union Oil Co. of California, 71 I.D. 169 (1964) reversed in Udall v.
Oil Shale Corp., 406 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1969) cert. granted October 13,
1969 sub nom Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp.
See, for example, Associate Solicitor's Opinion M-36776, GFS Oil and Gas,
SO-1969-15.
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works within the Department of Interior. One wishes that the
Administrative Procedure Study had documented the actual
functioning of the appeal process more thoroughly. How are
issues framed, what does the record consist of, who is consulted, who participates in the decision, who writes the opinion,
etc., etc. are some of the pertinent questions that might have
been answered. In fact no clear picture of how the adjudicative process works in practice emerges from the Study. Appraisal is further complicated by the fact that the Department
adopted substantial modifications in its appeal procedures
almost simultaneously with the publication of the Commission's Report.38
For descriptive purposes adjudication pertaining to public lands within the Department of the Interior can be divided
into two broad classifications- (1) mining and grazing contests which are subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act39 and (2) cases arising under the Mineral
Leasing Act and other matters pertaining to public land administration which are not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act.4 0 A basic difference between the two procedures
is the fact that the former involves a hearing as of right before
a Hearing Examiner and results in a record as well as reasonably well defined issues. The latter procedure usually involves
written submittals with little opportunity to determine issues
or to know and meet the opposing contentions of the staff.
The APA type case (mining or grazing) involved a staff
determination, hearing before an examiner, examiner's decision, appeal to the Director of the Bureau of Land Management, appeal from the Director to the Secretary (in fact, the
38. 35 F.R. 10010 (June 18, 1970), amending 43 C.F.R. §§ 23.12, Part 1840,
Subpart 1842, Subpart 1843, and Part 1850.
39. The division made here is between proceedings within the Administrative
Procedure Act and proceedings that do not conform to the Administrative
Procedure Act. APA proceedings and non-APA proceedings is the terminology employed. In fact, the regulations refer to private contest proceedings
(43 C.F.R. § 1852.1), government contest proceedings involving mining
claims (43 C.F.R. § 1852.2) and grazing proceedings (43 C.F.R. § 1853.1)
in all of which a procedure conforming with the Administrative Procedure
Act is provided for and appeal procedures applicable (43 C.F.R. § 1842.2) to
any other case in which a party is adversely affected by a decision of an
officer of the Bureau of Land Management which is subject to procedure
that does not conform to the Administrative Procedure Act. On mining
contest and the APA see Keith v. O'Leary, 63 I.D. 341 (1963).
40. See Richard K. Todd, 68 I.D. 291 (1961).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss1/23

12

Bloomenthal: Administrative Procedures

1970

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDUPE

Solicitor of the Department"). Non-APA cases generally involved staff determination, appeal to the Director of the
Bureau of Land Management, appeal from the Director to
the Secretary (in fact, the Solicitor of the Department). The
recent revisions will not change the basic distinction between
A-PA and non-APA type cases, but the appeal to the Director
of the Bureau of Land Management has been eliminated and
there is but one appeal to a newly created Board of Land Appeals, the decision of which is final.
Some of the deficiencies of the non-APA proceeding can
be illustrated by an adjudicated case: Applicant applies for
a phosphate permit which is available (as distinguished from
a competitive lease) only if "exploratory work is necessary to
determine the existence or workability of phosphate deposits."" The area contains known prosphate deposits so the
sole issue is their workability. The Manager of the State Land
Office denies the application because the U.S.G.S. "reports
that its records show the presence of phosphate in sufficient
quantity and quality to warrant development under lease.... "
Appellant is informed that it has "the burden of proving by
presenting positive and substantial evidence wherein the decision appealed from is in error." Fortuitously, there are
some U.S.G.S. publications available and these are used as the
basis for an affidavit submitted by an expert witness as part
of appellant's case on appeal. Appellant also submits legal
arguments directed to the appropriate standard for determining workability. The decision of the Director of the Bureau
of Land Management rejects these arguments and is supported
by a so-called supplemental report of the Director, Geological
Survey which is in effect a response by the U.S.G.S. to appellant's contentions.4 3 On further appeal to the Secretary the
Geological Survey presented an additional supplemental report which largely accepts appellant's position."'
A happy result from appellant's standpoint, but one which
was possible only because the available literature, appellant 's
41. 24 F.R. 1348, § 210.2.2A (4) (a) (February 21, 1959).
42. 30 U.S.C.A. § 211(b).
43. Gas Hills Uranium Company, Wyoming 0317674, April 18, 1967.
44. American Nuclear Corporation, A-30808, March 5, 1968.
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persistence and reference to a U.S.G.S. Report in the Director's opinion made it possible to bring the issues out into the
open. It is submitted that the appeal procedure to meet due
process requirements in non-APA cases must afford affected
parties a better opportunity of knowing and meeting the ease
against it. The Department has been relying on the government's plenary control over public lands4 5 and the privilege
vs. right distinction" to jusitfy its patently unfair procedures
in non-APA cases. The privilege vs. right distinction is dead
in the light of recent Supreme Court decisions in other areas ;47
if a welfare recipient is entitled to know and meet in an appripriate manner the case against him for termination or
denial of benefits it is likely that an applicant for authorized
uses of public lands has a similar constitutional right."8 Even
informal conference type procedures4 9 afford an applicant
better protection in terms of meeting the case against him than
the present appeal procedures.
The Commission's Report without focusing very sharply
states broadly that "there is little assurance that due adjudicative process will be afforded most applicants for public land
dispositions.""0 The Report suggests that an applicant be afforded an opportunity to present his case at least informally
at the time applications are considered before such applications are denied." The Study comments on the fact that in socalled appeal cases the government does not present its case5 2
and the Report recommends "open participation by the Government official rendering the intitial decision below . . ." in
45. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
46. Richard K. Todd, 68 I.D. 291 (1961). But see Wolf Joint Venture, 75 I.D. 137
(1968).
47. Goldberg v. Kelly, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). "Such benefits [welfare benefits] are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to
receive them. . . . The constitutional challenge cannot he answered by an
argument that public assistance benefits are a 'privilege' and not a 'right.'"
Id. at 1017.
48. Ibid. The key to Goldberg v. Kelly appears to be a procedure appropriate
to the situation. In the author's judgment something less than the type of
hearing insisted upon in Goldberg v. Kelly would satisfy the due process
requirements in most land appeal cases. The Court's protection of the welfare
recipient may be based upon such recipient's disadvantaged position and the
fact that at issue is usually some aspect of the recipient's personal conduct.
49. See discussion at note 80, infra.
50. REPORT, 253.
51. ADMINISTTARTIVE PROCEDURES STUDY 165-166; REPORT 253.
52. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES STUDY 174 and fn170 at 214.
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the appellate process so as to help "eliminate complaints about
ex parte communications."" The Report also states that "it is
clear that in a number of situations reports, comments, etc.
are thereafter furnished to the adjudication officer as part of
his decisional process...""
The Commission has intuitively felt that something was
wrong with the adjudicative process, but has directed its attention at the right areas for the wrong reasons or with sound
reasons for its criticisms has misconceived the nature of the
problem. The processing of the application is not the appropriate time for affording the applicant an opportunity to
present his case. The existing appeal procedures provide an
adequate and more feasible opportunity to do so from a timing
standpoint. The inadequacy in these procedures relates primarily to the failure to afford the applicant an opportunity
to know and meet the case against him. This is not solely attributable to the fact that his right to a hearing is only a discretionary one." In many instances there are no disputed
facts and a trial-type meeting would be a cumbersome method
of framing the issues. 6 The fact, however, that the government never openly presents its case, but presents argument
secretly to adjudicators is relevant to the basic procedural defect. The government should present its case not to eliminate
complaints about ex parte communications but to afford private parties an opportunity to meet the case against them.
Further, the person presenting the government's case should
not be the "official rendering the initial decision below" but
a member of the staff trained to present the government's case
on appeal. Nor should adjudicators be denied the opportunity
of consulting ex parte with staff members who have not participated in the proceedings provided they are consulted for the
purpose of evaluating a properly developed record rather than
for the purpose of furnishing the very basis for the decision. 7
53.

REPORT 253.

54. Ibid.
55. 43 C.F.R. § 1843.6.
56. See Robertson v. Udall, 349 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Richard K. Todd,
68 I.D. 291 (1961). But compare Wolf Joint Venture, 75 I.D. 137 (1968).
57. For one view of the appropriate scope of staff consultations and ex parte
communications see Bloomenthal, The Revised Model State Administrative
Procedure Act-Reform or Retrogression?, 1963 DUKE L. J. 593, 614-619.
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The newly revised procedures of the Department do not
rectify the foregoing criticisms. The intermediate appeal is
eliminated which seems desirable in view of the fact that for
the most part two employee appeal boards (Office of Appeals
and Hearings and the Bureau of Land Appeals) never officially styled as such were performing precisely the same functions of adjudicating, deciding and opinion writing. The new
Board of Land Appeals will be a part of the Office of Hearings and Appeals, the Director of which has been delegated
"all the supervisory authority of the Secretary over hearings
and appeals. ... " Thusly, the decision and opinion writing
function has been taken out of the Solicitor's Office. The
Report had recommended such removal on the grounds that it
tended to create the appearance of combining the deciding and
prosecuting function." In the author's view the inclusion of
this function in the Solicitor's Office is a reflection of the 19th
Century view that the decision making function simply involves the application of the law which should be best known
to the Solicitor.
The decision of the Department to create a Board of Land
Appeals whose decision will be final reflects a similar attitude
(that is, mechanical application of well defined rules) toward
the role of an administrative adjudicator. It is in fact a departure from the recommendations of the Commission, which
would have eliminated two levels of appeal as of a matter of
right" but which recommended against a Board of Appeals"'
and recommended for a discretionary right of appeal to the
Secretary from the initial decision on appeal.62 The unfortunate aspect of an Appeal Board, particularly one whose decisions are final, is the complete separation of the decision
making function from the policy making function. While presumably the Secretary and the Director of the Office of Hearings and Appeals can continue to exercise the supervisory
58. 35 F.R. 12081 (July 28, 1970).
59. REPORT 254-255.

60. Id. at 256. The recomniemndations in this regard are particularly pertinent to
Forest Service procedures which involve five levels of appeals and with respect to which the apropriate procedure depends upon a prior classification
as to the type of appeal involved. See ADMINISTARTIVE PROCEDURES STUDY
176-178.
61. REPORT 254.
62. Id. at 256.
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authority of the Secretary in areas of major importance, the
new procedures will continue to isolate the Secretary and
others within the Department most concerned over policy
from any feel for the impact of the flow of decisions on policy.
The Commission rejected the idea of an independent
Board because it would "dilute the Secretary's managerial
and supervisory authority over public land matters . . .""
This seems somewhat inconsistent with the recommendations
of the Commission previously discussed which assume that it
is possible for the public land agencies by appropriate exercise of rule-making powers to largely eliminate the exercise
of discretion from the adjudicative process. 4 In fact, in rejecting the independent board the Commission recognized that
it could "only be fully effective if it can operate against some
fairly specific guidelines . . . which spell out the nature of
rights or privileges at issue . . . ,,"" The Commission in simplistic fashion assumed that its other recommendations would
assure such guidelines and eliminate the necessity for an independent administrative review board. While the Board of
Land Appeals is not a completely independent Board, the unfortunate result of its creation may very well be the divorcing
of policy formulation and responsibility for policy from each
other.6 6
The revised regulations also eliminate the obsolete Field
Commissioner and provide, in lieu thereof, that the Board of
Land Appeals may in its discretion in a non-APA case appoint
a trial examiner to hold hearings on relevant, disputed factual
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 254.
Supra.
REPORT 254.
In fact, the general hearing and appeal procedures of the Department of Interior suggest a lack of concern and/or appreciation of the importance of
the adjudicative process on the part of the Secretary of the Interior. There
are now four separate Boards of Appeals (Contract, Land, Mine Operations
and Indian) and provision for creating ad hoc Boards from personnel within
the Office of Hearings and Appeals for cases not within the jurisdiction of
an established Board. The decisions of all the Boards (with the exception
of ad hoc boards) are final. To the extent any coordination at all among
the Boards exists it can arise only as a result from the fact that all of the
Boards are a part of the Office of Hearings and Appeals which is under a
single Director to whom the Secretary has delegated his supervisory authority over hearings and appeals. Administrative adjudication within the
Department of the Interior is now entrusted largely, if not completely, to
relatively low level departmental employees.
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questions.0 7 While not explicitly so providing, the revision of
the regulations in this regard may be precursor of a more
liberal attitude on the part of the Board of Land Appeals to
authorize hearings. The regulations also provide with respect
to non-APA cases that oral argument may, within the discretion of the Board of Land Appeals, be allowed in some cases.6 8
To the extent that the Board of Land Appeals liberally allows
hearings and oral argument, appellants should be in a better
position to determine the nature of the staff's case. However,
nothing has been done to directly rectify the basic procedural
problems referred to above and, in fact, the elimination of the
Director's decision on appeal eliminated the one means available for appellants to determine the case against them and to
meet such case on appeal. In fact, appellants were successful
under the old procedure in reversing the decisions of the Director on appeal to the Secretary in a significant number of
cases. Since presumably the personnel in the two former appeals offices are being combined and are now working for a
multiple member Board of Land Appeals it will be interesting
to observe the quality of the decision making process under
the new regime.
The Commission recommended that Secretarial review
be "adequately insulated from management officials and legal
advisors who have participated in decisions below, except for
direct, open presentation of argument. . . . " This type of
separation does, of course, exist with respect to APA type
proceedings within the Department" and to a degree has been
voluntarily imposed in non-APA appeal cases. 1 The new
regulations pertaining to the Board of Land Appeals provide
that no member of the Board who has taken a part in the investigation or prosecution of the case shall not participate in
67.
68.
69.
70.

43 C.F.R. § 1843.5.
43 C.F.R. § 1843.6.
REPoRT 255.
5 U.S.C.A. § 554(d) among other things, requires (subject to certain exceptions) with respect to every case of adjudication involving a trial-type
hearing that personnel who participated in the investigation or presentation
of the case be excluded from participation in the decision or agency review
of the decision.
71. Interview on August 27, 1965, with Thomas Cavanaugh, then Associate
Solicitor, Division 9f Public Lands, Department of Interior.
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the decision of the Board. 2 The unfortunate aspect of this
provision is that it is limited to members of the Board; it is
difficult to understand why the separation of function provisions of the APA which pertain to others participating in
the decision should not be applicable.7
INFORIMAL

ADJUDICATION

The Administrative Law Study pertaining to formal adjudication has a less than substantial empirical basis, and in
the less studied areas of informal decision making virtually
no empirical basis." Land classification pursuant to individual petition is severely criticized for failure to allow participation by the petitioner and because of the bifurcation of the
procedure," but the criticism is based almost entirely on a
priorireasoning. Yet, it is in those areas of informal decision
making that the need will arise for innovation if the new goals
set for the public land agencies in the Commission's Report
are to be realized efficiently and fairly. The traditional conception of rule-making, hearings, and judicial review are
simply not adequate to the task. There are within the public
land agencies procedures that could have been studied on the
operational level from which much could have been learned
72. Part 211, Ch. 13-Office of Hearings and Appeals, Department of Interior
Manual, Section 211.138 as same appears in 35 F.R. 12081 (July 28, 1970).
73. See note 70 supra.
74. One source for the empirical information referred to in the Study is a 1957
Questionnaire prepared by the Department of Interior for the House Committee on Government Operations. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES STUDY fn.
96 at 258. The contractor states, "It appears that the practices so reported
have not changed so far as can now be ascertained." Ibid.
75. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES STUDY 15, 294. The Study does outline in some
detail the procedures prescribed by the regulations for classification petitions.
Id. at 15. They are described as "providing no more than token participation
by those immediately interested . . ." Id. at 294. The procedures themselves
do not appear per se deficient; much might depend upon how they operate
in practice. The Study ignores the context in which petitions for classification have taken place in recent years; the fact that only archaic laws are
available for land disposition encouraging attempts to use homestead laws
for other purposes. The Study also ignores the background that led to taking
classification out of the normal adjudication channels; the fact that such
proceedings were clogging those channels and many regarded them as more
appropriate for administrative determination than legal decisions. Land
classification does necessarily involve substantial elements of judgment and
discretion; perhaps, such discretion is being exercised arbitrarily or unwisely but, if so, it is not documented by the Study. The Report of the Commission takes no position directly related to such procedures other than
noting that the elimination of classificcation cases from normal adjudication
procedures has resulted in much speedier action with respect to other phases
off the BLM's caseload. REPORT 255.
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in this regard. Such procedures include classification pursuant to individual petition, the special use procedures of the
Forest Service and the supervisory activities of the U.S.G.S.
with respect to leasing act operations. These activities are
much more akin to the future role of public land agencies in
determining particular uses," negotiating development requirements pertaining to mining, imposing environmetal requirements and the like. In some areas traditional procedures
including hearing procedures will remain appropriate (for
example, in all probability the cancellation of a mining permit
for failure to exercise the equivalent of "due diligence"), but
for the most part these decisions will either be made "administratively" or the whole machinery will be clogged with a monumental backlog. Porcedures must be adopted or found which
will at the same time protect against arbitrary action and afford affected parties an opportunity to present their position."
The lawyers' assumption that "hearings" are the only
means of resolving such issues is not adequate and there
is some recognition of this fact in the contractor's
Study."8 There are other methods available for the determination of issues, even those involving disputed facts,"9 that are
not necessarily arbitrary or unfair. The Atomic Energy Com76. Although the Bureau of Land Management has been classifying lands
generally for the past five years pursuant to the Classification and Multiple
Use Act of 1964 (43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1411-1418), the Report concludes that "it is
apparent that they were made in a hurried manner on the basis of inadequate
information." REPORT 53. The Report recommends, in effect, that the
job be done over with better guidelines from Congress supplemented by an
analytical system to be developed by the agency for implementation of those
standards. Id. at 45-48. To the extent lands are classified prior to actual use
the need for individual determinations will be reduced. However, it is illusory
to think such general classification will eliminate entirely the need for determinations as to individual tracts and individual petitions. The planners may
determine a particular area suitable for urban development; those with
funds available to invest may prefer (and with good reason) another area.
Further, irrespective of notice to third party interests, opportunity to be
heard etc. in connection with a proposed general classification, there will
always be affected parties who for a number of reasons will not be in a
position to protest and oppose the particular land use until an actual use
of the lands is proposed.
77. "In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact,
due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses." Goldberg v. Kelly, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 1021. However, it is submitted that there are two important qualifications- (1) the decision must
"turn" on a question of fact, that is, must be directly and critically involved.
(2) The Court is referring to what Professor Davis calls adjudicative facts,
that is, those concerning what a party did and with what motive. See Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise, § 7.02 (1958).
78. ADMINISTRAT1vE PROCEDURES STUDY 298-299.
79. See, however, note 66 supra with respect to critical adjudicative facts.
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mission administered its allocation of source materials program involving, among other issues, a determination of individual property reserves without adjudication in the traditional sense." While the procedures employed are open to
criticism in some respects81 and one may even question the fundamental procurement policies effectated, affected parties
were afforded an opportunity to make their case. They did
so through conferences with staff members responsible for
estimating reserves, negotiation with staff members responsible for making the initial decision, and an informal review
(when demanded) with higher echelon officials. The Forest
Service apparently, in some areas, operates much in the same
manner and a close look at how the system operates in practice
would have been an unique 2 and an invaluable contribution
to the administrative law literature.
The Study is rightly critical of the failure of the public
land agencies to publish in a readily available fashion the procedures (formal and informal) available to private parties.8
The inadequacies in this regard will inevitably be compounded,
if as one surmises, informal decision making necessarily plays
a larger role in the future of public land administration. If
there is one thing clear in this, until recently ignored area, 4 it
is that there must be channels available for presenting one's
grievances, those channels must be kept open and they must be
widely known.
JuDICiAL REvmw

The doctrine of sovereign immunity which bars private
litigants at the gate of judicial review where Congress has
failed to provide for judicial review of administrative action
80. See Lewis and Rooker, Domestic Uranium Procurement-History and Problems, 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 449 (1966).
81. In particular the informal procedures were not spelled out specifically in the
regulations but rather developed as the result of experience accumulated
over a period of time.
82. Professor Davis has undertaken some limited empirical studies reflected in
Davis, Discretionary Justice--A Preliminary Inquiry (1969).
83. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES STUDY 263-265.
84. See Davis, Discretionary Justice-A Preliminary Inquiry (1969); Woll,
Administrative Law-The Informal Process (1963).
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is much under attack." A case involving the Department of
Interior"5 which dramatizes the inability of one to contest the
government's claim to title is sometimes used to demonstrate
the untoward consequences of the doctrine. The Commission's
Report recommends that sovereign immunity no longer be a
bar in a title dispute with the United States. 7 However, it
goes further and recommends generally that sovereign immunity not be a bar to judicial review of public land agency decisions." Unfortunately, it would also attempt to control the
standing issue by limiting the right to review to those who were
actually a party to the administrative proceedings. 9 Since the
Report recommends liberal third-party intervention ° and improved methods for giving notice to third-party interest,91 in
theory this should not be a serious limitation. But, in fact, it
will not be possible to give the type of notice to third-party
interest contemplated by the Report. It is inconceivable, for
example, to expect some type of public notice to be given before
every oil and gas lease, every permit etc. is issued. In those
instances in which there is no real opportunity for the thirdparty to timely present his position before the administrative agency they should not without further ado be denied
standing.9 2 The real problem with a liberal judicial review
concept is that it fails to take into account the type of discretion that should not be subject to judicial review. This involves, among other things, considering the type of issue with
respect to which judicial review can make a real contribution.
Rather than a carte blanche provision for judicial review
there is need for either some hard thinking on a statute by
statute, procedure by procedure basis as to those areas in
which the administrative decision should be final or in the alSee, for example, Davis, Sovereign I'mmunity Must Go, 22 ADM. L. REV. 383
(1970). S. 3568 attacking the problem of sovereign immunity generally is
now under consideration by Congress.
86. Gardner v. Harris, 391 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1968).
87. REPORT 261.
85.

88.

REPORT 256-257.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 257.
Id. at 253-254.
Id. at 254.
One wonders why the Commission otherwise concerned about third party
interests should regret recent judicial liberalization of the standing issue.
REPORT 257. On standing see Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Flast v. Cohen. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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ternative some general language designed to preserve an area
of unreviewable administrative discretion. Since the Commission generally favors spelling out specifically legal rights
and obligations," presumably, the Commission would favor
such an approach if it had considered the problem. In view of
the importance of the questions involved this appears an appropriate area for Congress to make deliberate choices rather
than to leave it for judicial determination.
CONCLUSION

The Report generally contains a sense of urgency over
the need to use our limited public lands wisely and the increasingly important contribution the public lands can make
to the general welfare during the concluding decades of the
20th Century. Substantively the Report looks to the future,
but procedurally it looks to the past. The Report generally
adopts progressive attitudes on substantive issues, but unforunately relies on administrative procedures hardly adequate for the last half of the 19th Century. There is need for
reform of the administrative procedures of the public land
agencies; hopefully, if nothing else the Report and underlying
study will cause the agencies concerned to take a better look
at themselves. There is much in the Report and the Study
which the agencies, if they have the will, can utilize as a point
of departure in critically evaluating and improving their own
administrative performance.

93.

See discussion at note 24, supra.
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